Rutherford v. United States

In 2003, Daniel Rutherford robbed a Pennsylvania chiropractic office at gunpoint twice within five days, and was convicted of two counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). At the time, a second such conviction automatically triggered a stacked, consecutive 25-year mandatory sentence on top of the first, contributing to a total sentence of nearly 42 years. 

In 2018, Congress's First Step Act eliminated that stacking requirement going forward, but did not make the change retroactive for people, like Rutherford, whose sentences were already final. Rutherford sought "compassionate release," arguing that the gap between his sentence and what he'd receive today was an "extraordinary and compelling reason" to reduce it.

The district court denied Rutherford's petition, following circuit precedent holding that courts may not consider the First Step Act's nonretroactive changes when deciding compassionate release requests, and the Third Circuit affirmed. Several other circuits had reached the same conclusion, but the issue had grown more complicated after the U.S. 

Sentencing Commission issued a new policy statement suggesting sentencing disparities like Rutherford's could count as extraordinary and compelling. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, heard oral argument on November 12, 2025, and issued its decision, written by

Justice Barrett, on May 28, 2026, alongside a companion case brought by Johnnie Carter.

Rutherford argued that Congress gave the Sentencing Commission broad authority to define what counts as an extraordinary and compelling reason for release, that the Commission had done exactly that by identifying sentencing disparities as a valid factor, and that courts owed deference to the Commission's expert judgment on the question. 

The government argued that Congress's deliberate choice not to make the First Step Act's anti-stacking reform retroactive would be undermined if courts could achieve the same result through the back door of compassionate release, and that the resulting sentencing gap simply reflects an ordinary, foreseeable consequence of nonretroactivity, not anything extraordinary.

A 6–3 Court sided with the government, holding that when Congress chooses not to make a sentencing change retroactive, the resulting disparity cannot by itself, or combined with other factors, serve as an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release, regardless of what the Sentencing Commission's policy statement says. 

Justice Sotomayor's dissent, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, argued the Commission's policy was lawful and that courts should be permitted to weigh these disparities case by case. The ruling closes off a legal strategy that had been gaining traction in federal courts nationwide, meaning thousands of prisoners serving lengthy stacked firearm sentences imposed before 2018 cannot point to the law's later change as grounds for a reduced sentence.